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29 Jun 2001


USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

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The Middle East Weapons Proliferation Issue

Ed Warner

Washington

23 Jun 2001 00:25 UTC

One of the major obstacles to better relations between the United States and the so-called rogue states, such as Iran and Iraq, is their attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Some analysts say efforts to reduce the spread of such weapons are compromised if the United States overlooks Israel's growing arsenal. Other Middle East experts, however, say this is irrelevant.

The U.S. effort to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction involves a contradiction, said Charles Freeman, president of the Middle East Policy Council.

Speaking at a recent meeting in the U.S. Library of Congress, Mr. Freeman said the United States works to keep weaponry away from nations like Iran, but ignores the substantial Israeli arsenal. This may not worry the United States, but it does Arab nations. "The possession by Israel of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and

biological - is a stimulus to proliferation in the region generally," he said. "That cannot be denied. And it may well be the Israelis made a historic mistake developing that particular arsenal, given its implications. There are concerns in Arab countries about what the Israeli arsenal is for."

But for Mr. Freeman, Israel is not the Arabs' only concern. The South Asian nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, pose another complication. "They are on the other side of Iran and Iraq, and they, too, have their stimulating effect on countries like Iran. So one has to be rather pessimistic about the prospect of avoiding future proliferation of weapons that are designed to kill people in very large numbers in the region as a whole."

Mr. Freeman notes it is not Israel but Iraq that resorted to using these weapons, with chemical attacks on dissident Kurds and Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war.

That is the case, says Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service. Iraq creates the greater fear for the use of the weapons, and for that reason requires closer watch. "After the Persian Gulf War of '91, which Saddam lost quite clearly, he made essentially a bargain," he said. "He is going to keep his regime, and in exchange, he is going to dismantle all of his weapons of mass destruction. The fact of the matter is there are U.N. resolutions that encapsulate that bargain, and he is required to abide by it."

All very well, says Fraser Cameron, a leader of the Delegation of the European Commission, but put yourself in the position of Iraqis or Iranians, who are so militarily weak. "If you were in the leadership in Iran, what sort of security policy would you want to pursue?" he said. "And I think if you can put yourself into the mind-set of the elite, considering the dangers, we might actually be able to have a more reflective policy."

While trying to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of other nations, Mr. Cameron says, the nuclear states should reduce their own arsenals to the lowest possible level. Then non-proliferation would be taken more seriously.

<http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=A90A898A-674A-11D5-841A00508BF9712A&Title=The%20Middle%20East%20Weapons%20Proliferation%20Issue>

Central Asia/Russia

Chemical weapons stocks endanger Russia

By Sergei Blagov

MOSCOW - Environmentalists warn that Russia faces potentially huge health and ecological hazards from its chemical weapons dumps, many dating to World War II.

Moscow had pledged to destroy the munitions but has moved slowly, citing insufficient funds. The trouble is, many of the dumps have simply been "lost and forgotten", said Lev Fyodorov, head of the non-governmental Union for Chemical Safety.

Officially, Russia has stockpiled 44,000 tons of poisonous military gases at seven storage facilities. Moscow has promised to destroy its chemical weapons by 2008 under the international Chemical Weapons Convention, which it ratified in November 1997. The program has fallen behind schedule and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has invoked a provision in the convention that would allow Russia an additional five years, extending the deadline to 2012.

Additionally, Moscow has repeatedly asked for more international aid to defray the costs of safely destroying the deadly chemicals, most of which are nerve agents. The government previously announced that it would need US\$5.5 billion to liquidate its chemical arsenal but this month re-estimated the cost at \$7 billion, said Zinoviy Pak, head of Russia's Munitions Agency.

Fyodorov, however, insisted the situation is far worse than the government realizes. In addition to the seven official storage facilities in Russia itself, hundreds of caches remain buried throughout the former Soviet Union, including several sites in Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Complicating matters further, some of the sites are former testing grounds where unexploded ordnance was left behind.

Although the Chemical Weapons Convention deals with post-World War II chemical stocks, he added, weapons produced between 1915 and 1946 remain unaccounted for. Many were buried under military installations that have since been converted into residential areas and national parks.

Fyodorov said that under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the government must identify all the sites and begin destroying the old weapons. "Yet nothing has been done so far," he said. Russian officials denied Fyodorov's claims, saying that the problem was not that big. They conceded, however, that there could be some contamination resulting from old storage sites or unexploded chemical ordnance.

Fyodorov insisted he had checked some 300 files from military archives and found concrete evidence of the dumps. He said some chemical barrels and bombs had already been excavated in the Moscow districts of Kuzminki and Ochakovo - former chemical dumps that now are densely populated areas.

Before and during World War II, expired chemical weapons and waste from chemical weapons plants were buried without any system and rarely with records, Fyodorov said. Moreover, in the wake of chemical weapons tests, nobody bothered to collect unexploded bombs and shells. Munitions experts calculated the barrels' and bombs 10-millimeter walls have rusted at a rate of one millimeter every six years - meaning they likely have rusted through. Fyodorov and others warned that even tiny amounts of substances such as mustard gas could cause cancer, physical mutations, and other health problems in humans.

At the same time, Russia and other nations face the problem of more than 300,000 tons of chemical weaponry dumped at sea. Most of this was confiscated from Nazi Germany at the end of World War II but some 45,000 tons came from stocks maintained by Allied armed forces. The bulk has sunk to the seabed between Norway, Sweden and Denmark, where the Baltic Sea meets the North Sea. The Soviet fleet sunk a smaller quantity in the Baltic Sea off Kaliningrad. Half of the barrels, which have been under water for more than half a century, contain mustard gas. The rest contain a dozen other deadly poisons. The locations of the underwater dumps are well known, Fyodorov said.

By contrast, many underground dumps were simply "lost and forgotten" and could contain a total of up to 120,000 tons of chemical weapons. If his estimates are correct, those stocks are greater than the current arsenals of Russia and the United States combined.

Moscow has been keen to demonstrate its commitment to the international Chemical Weapons Convention. Earlier this month, Russian officials and foreign diplomats visited Shchuchye, in the Ural Mountains, to launch construction of the country's biggest weapons-destruction facility. About 14 percent of Russia's 44,000-ton chemical arsenal is stored at Shchuchye.

The ceremony was designed to thank international donors for committing \$1 billion to help build Shchuchye and six other plants. Washington has pledged \$888 million to the effort. Shchuchye is due to open in 2004. Moscow expects to spend some \$400 million to build the destruction facilities. The government pledged \$120 million for the program in this year's budget, six times more than in 2000.

Fyodorov, however, said the facilities under construction would use untested destruction technologies. "These projects could become yet another experiment involving people employed at these facilities," he said.

(Inter Press Service)

<http://atimes.com/c-asia/CF26Ag01.html>

Johns Hopkins Working Group On Civilian Biodefense Warns Tularemia -- Rabbit Fever -- Could Be Bioweapon Threat

The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, an expert panel convened by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, says that the highly infectious disease tularemia — also known as rabbit fever — could pose serious consequences if used as a biological weapon. In underscoring the importance of this issue, the report cites a World Health Organization study which projected estimates of 250,000 illnesses and 19,000 deaths in the event that a mass-casualty tularemia biological weapon were used against a modern city of 5 million people. In this latest report, the Hopkins Working Group recommends medical and public health guidelines and policies to minimize the consequences from an attack. The report is published in the June 6, issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).

“This report highlights the need to address the nation’s preparedness and response to possible bioweapon-induced epidemics,” says the report’s lead author, David T. Dennis, MD, MPH, a member of the Hopkins Working Group and a senior researcher with the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).

According to the report, a tularemia-based bioweapon would trigger cases of pneumonia, pleuritis, and lymph node disease within three to five days after exposure. Unless treated with effective antibiotics, the disease could lead to serious illness including possible respiratory failure, shock, or death.

“Diagnostic testing capabilities are available for tularemia, but they are not widely available. Effective antibiotic treatment regimens also exist for tularemia, but they are not the antibiotics clinicians would likely prescribe for routine treatment of pneumonia. Given the rarity of tularemia and the non-specific features of the disease, clinicians are not likely to order the needed diagnostic test, nor begin the proper antibiotics until some time into an epidemic,” explains Dr. Dennis.

Tularemia is caused by exposure to *Francisella tularensis* bacteria, which affect both animals and people. It is sometimes called “rabbit fever” because it often infects hunters and trappers who are exposed to contaminated animals or meat. It can also be spread to humans by tick or insect bites, inhaling infected dust, or eating or drinking contaminated materials, but it not spread from person to person.

Rabbits, voles, squirrels, and other small animals are natural hosts for the disease. Tularemia occurs rarely in the United States. Last summer, an outbreak of tularemia pneumonia occurred in Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts. Cases of the disease were associated with infected dust from lawn mowing and other landscaping activities, which presumably stirred up contaminated dust. Outbreaks commonly occur in Europe and Russia.

“One of the priorities that emerges from this analysis includes the need to develop simple, widely-available, rapid diagnostic tests that could be used to identify persons infected with *F. tularensis*. We also need a better understanding of how effective new classes of antibiotics would be in treating this old scourge of tularemia,” says Thomas Inglesby, MD, one of the report’s authors and a researcher with the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health.

In addition, the Hopkins Working Group report recommends the development of testing that can rapidly identify the antibiotic susceptibility of tularemia strains, allowing public health officials to make the most effective and timely interventions. The possibility that genetically induced antibiotic-resistant strains could be used as weapons has made this even more important, not only for tularemia, but for other potential weapons as well.

A tularemia vaccine is not currently available for general use, and it is only recommended for laboratory workers who are routine exposed to the disease. The Hopkins Working Group encourages the development of new DNA-based or antibody-based vaccines that could provide fast acting protection from tularemia both before and after exposure.

Over the past two years, the Working Group for Civilian Biodefense has published recommendations in JAMA for responding to potential terrorist use of smallpox, anthrax, plague, and botulism bioweapons. Further reports are anticipated. Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health.

The study was funded by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health.

<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2001/06/010611071209.htm>

Tularemia as a Biological Weapon

Medical and Public Health Management

David T. Dennis, MD, MPH; Thomas V. Inglesby, MD; Donald A. Henderson, MD, MPH; John G. Bartlett, MD; Michael S. Ascher, MD; Edward Eitzen, MD, MPH; Anne D. Fine, MD; Arthur M. Friedlander, MD; Jerome Hauer, MHS; Marcelle Layton, MD; Scott R. Lillibridge, MD; Joseph E. McDade, PhD; Michael T. Osterholm, PhD, MPH; Tara O'Toole, MD, MPH; Gerald Parker, PhD, DVM; Trish M. Perl, MD, MSc; Philip K. Russell, MD; Kevin Tonat, DrPH, MPH; for the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense

Objective The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if tularemia is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population.

Participants The working group included 25 representatives from academic medical centers, civilian and military governmental agencies, and other public health and emergency management institutions and agencies.

Evidence MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to October 2000, using the Medical Subject Headings *Francisella tularensis*, *Pasteurella tularensis*, *biological weapon*, *biological terrorism*, *bioterrorism*, *biological warfare*, and *biowarfare*. Review of these references led to identification of relevant materials published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other references and sources.

Consensus Process Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process were reviewed by members of the working group. Consensus was achieved on the final draft.

Conclusions A weapon using airborne tularemia would likely result 3 to 5 days later in an outbreak of acute, undifferentiated febrile illness with incipient pneumonia, pleuritis, and hilar lymphadenopathy. Specific epidemiological, clinical, and microbiological findings should lead to early suspicion of intentional tularemia in an alert health system; laboratory confirmation of agent could be delayed. Without treatment, the clinical course could progress to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is recommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early postexposure period....

JAMA. 2001;285:2763-2773....

<http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v285n21/abs/jst10001.html>

Norfolk Virginian-Pilot
June 25, 2001

Nuclear Terrorism Might Be All But Inevitable

President George W. Bush is attempting to persuade skeptical foreign heads of state and many skeptical Americans of the merits of a multibillion-dollar missile defense against "rogue" states.

But hostile nations aren't the only concern. The Associated Press reported that Islamic militant Osama bin Laden's Afghanistan-based group virtually boasts, in a recruitment videotape, that its followers bombed the Norfolk-based destroyer Cole in Yemen's Aden harbor. That's a chilling reminder that terrorists sheltered by unfriendly nations can inflict much death and destruction.

In fact, shadowy terrorist cells can be just as dangerous as some nations. And terrorists don't always use explosions to do their bidding; the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in Tokyo's subway system killed 10 people and sickened others. Missile defense systems would be limited, to say the least, in their effectiveness against the multitude of terrorist threats.

To date, no ballistic missiles or nuclear explosives have been used in terrorist attacks, such as on New York City's World Trade Center, the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon, the military apartment compound in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Embassy in Kenya. A small boat packed with non-nuclear explosives blasted a hole in the Cole, killing 17 crew members, wounding 39 others and nearly sinking the warship.

Timothy McVeigh, a home-grown villain, committed the most murderous terrorist act yet on U.S. soil by exploding the truck bomb that shattered the Oklahoma City federal building, killing 168 men, women and children. There may well be more truck-bomb attacks by America's paranoids and Islamic militants and other terrorists who regard themselves as holy warriors. It is also a possibility that terrorists one day will trigger a nuclear explosion destroying a major city, port or military installation.

Surely Osama bin Laden fantasizes a nuclear strike. He has the money and the organization to sponsor one or more against the United States, Israel or other countries. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein also has what's needed to commit nuclear terrorism. Material and information required for assembly of nuclear bombs are available.

Intelligence agencies worldwide monitor terrorist threats. But terrorists have advantages because of the abundance of vulnerable targets and the ability to choose where, how and when to attack.

On the other hand, intercontinental-ballistic-missile launch sites are easier to find and destroy before becoming operational. And a fired missile's origin can be pinpointed swiftly and the attacking "rogue" state blown to Kingdom Come by a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Terrorist plots are often broken up and the plotters arrested. But not often enough, as the lengthening list of terrorist bombings mournfully confirms. It is realistic for Americans and others to expect the worse while bin Laden and other terrorists plot. It is not so realistic to believe that a hugely expensive, unreliable missile defense system would be the best application of resources against the terrorist threat.

Wall Street Journal
June 27, 2001

Toward 21st-Century Deterrence

By Donald H. Rumsfeld

President Bush's recent visit to Europe capped a month of intensive consultations with allies and friends by Secretary of State Colin Powell, by me, and by other senior officials on the need to move beyond the Cold War and fashion an approach to security that is tailored to the 21st century. We found growing recognition that the threats we will face in decades ahead are changing. As Russia's defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, said after our meeting at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "There are not only more threats facing us now in the 21st century, but they are multifaceted, much more so than they were in the past."

A Peaceful World

At this moment, we are enjoying the benefits of unprecedented global economic expansion, driven by information technology, innovative entrepreneurs, and the spread of democracy and free market economies. But we cannot have a prosperous world unless we have a peaceful one. The security and stability that the U.S. armed forces provide is the critical underpinning of that peace and prosperity.

Imagine what might happen if a rogue state were to demonstrate the capability to strike U.S. or European populations with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction. A policy of intentional vulnerability by the Western nations could give this state the power to hold us hostage.

This scenario leaves us with three choices in the face of aggression: acquiesce and allow the rogue to invade its neighbors; oppose it and put Western population centers at risk; or pre-empt its action.

Intentional vulnerability would make building coalitions against aggression difficult, if not impossible, and could lead to a rise in isolationism -- something we can ill afford without damaging economic progress in the still dangerous and untidy world of the new century. If we are to extend this period of peace as far into this new century as possible, we must anticipate the new threats we will face.

What might those new challenges be? As I told my fellow defense ministers at the NATO meeting, the only thing we know for certain is that it is unlikely that any of us knows what is likely. Consider the track record during my lifetime:

I was born in 1932. The Great Depression was under way and the defense planning assumption was: "No war for 10 years."

By 1939, World War II had begun, and in 1941 the Navy we constructed to deter war became the first target of a naval war of aggression in the Pacific. Airplanes did not even exist at the start of the century; by World War II, bombers, fighters, and transports critically affected the outcome of the war.

By the 1950s, our wartime ally, the Soviet Union, had become our Cold War adversary. The Atomic Age had shocked the world and, with little warning, war was underway in Korea.

In the early 1960s, few had focused on Vietnam. By the end of the decade the U.S. was embroiled in war there.

In the mid-1970s, Iran was a U.S. ally and the regional bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism; a few years later, Iran underwent an anti-Western revolution and became the region's motor of Islamic fundamentalism.

In March 1989, Dick Cheney appeared before the Senate for his confirmation hearings as secretary of defense. Not one person uttered the word "Iraq." Within a year, he was preparing for war in the Persian Gulf.

That recent history should make us humble. It tells me that the world of 2015 will almost certainly be unlike today's, and notably different from what today's experts are confidently forecasting. But while it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us in coming decades, or where, or when, it is less difficult to anticipate how we will be threatened.

We know, for example, that our open borders and open societies make it easy for terrorists to strike, and that our dependence on computer-based information networks make those networks attractive targets for new forms of cyber-attack. The spread of advanced conventional weapons will present new challenges in force projection. And our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles creates incentives for missile proliferation which, combined with the development of weapons of mass destruction, could give future adversaries the ability to blackmail us. Because of the speed of technological change, we must prepare to meet these threats now, before they fully emerge.

President Bush has declared his intention to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with our present and future national security needs and alliance commitments. But reductions in U.S. nuclear forces are just one part of a larger vision -- a realization that we need a new response to a world that is notably different from the Cold War.

During the Cold War, our aim was to prevent one hostile power from using an arsenal of existing weapons against us. In the 21st century, our challenge is to deter multiple potential adversaries not only from using existing weapons, but also to dissuade them from developing dangerous new capabilities in the first place. Just as we intend to build "layered defenses" to deal with missile threats at different stages, we also need a strategy of "layered deterrence" that can deal with a variety of emerging threats at different stages.

For example, America's overwhelming naval power discourages potential adversaries from investing significant resources into a competing Navy to threaten freedom of the seas -- because, in the end, it would cost a fortune and not accomplish their strategic objectives. In the same way, we need to fashion military capabilities for the new century that, by their very existence, dissuade potential adversaries from investing significant resources into a range of dangerous new capabilities. This is the case with ballistic missile defenses, which, along with nuclear deterrence, diplomacy, arms control, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, will be an important layer in our deterrence strategy.

Today, the number of countries -- many of them desperately poor -- that are developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction is growing. The number of ballistic missiles, and the number of countries possessing them, is growing as well. The existence of this threat is not debatable. It is real.

Our goal is to build and deploy defenses to protect our people and our forward-deployed forces, as well as to contribute to the defense of our friends and allies. We will test a range of technologies and approaches, and expect to deploy layered defenses to intercept relatively small numbers of ballistic missiles of various ranges in various phases of flight. If a rapidly emerging threat requires it, we may deploy test assets to provide rudimentary defenses against those threats, and intend to deploy limited defenses consistent with technical maturity and the threat.

The missile defenses we deploy will be precisely that -- defenses. They will threaten no one, save those who would seek to threaten us with ballistic missile attack. They are certainly no threat to Russia. The purpose of missile defense is to protect against a limited number of missiles of increasing range and sophistication from rogue states -- not against the thousand of missiles in Russia's arsenal.

New Framework

And that leads to another principle of a new deterrence framework: Russia is not our enemy. The Cold War is over. The world has changed. We expect to deal with Russia as we deal with other countries, not as a state with which we are locked in a posture of Cold War antagonism and mutually assured destruction.

Deploying missile defenses will require moving beyond the ABM Treaty. The U.S. intends to build defenses to protect our people from ballistic missile attack -- and the ABM Treaty's very purpose is to prevent us from doing so. That treaty, a product of the Cold War, is no longer relevant to the security challenges of the new century.

In sum, missile defenses are just one element of a larger new framework for 21st-century deterrence -- but a critical part. As we continue to develop this framework, we will work to forge a common approach. We will face the 21st century's threats together, so we should work to address them together.

This is a matter of urgency. We are living in a unique moment of peace. Cold War threats have receded, but the new threats of the 21st century have not yet fully emerged. We need to take advantage of this period to ensure that we are prepared for the security challenges we will certainly face in the decades ahead -- so we can help to extend this era of peace well into this new century.

Mr. Rumsfeld is secretary of defense.

InsideDefense.com

June 26, 2001

Pentagon Restructure Of NMD Program Forces Release Of Critical Test Report

The Defense Department lost the right to keep a report about National Missile Defense test shortcomings from the public when it began restructuring the NMD program to address the report's findings, Rep. Christopher Shays (R-CT) said in a letter yesterday to the DOD general counsel.

The letter was sent on behalf of the House Governmental Reform national security subcommittee.

The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization "has initiated a restructuring of the NMD program . . . based in part on the observations, conclusions and recommendations in the August 2000 report," Shays writes in the June 25 letter. The subcommittee was aware of the changes being made to NMD for months, but had been unable to secure the report.

In a Feb. 22 letter to the subcommittee, acting Pentagon test director Lee Frame wrote that BMDO director Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish "initiated a restructuring of the NMD program . . . which generally addresses most of the testing limitations to some degree over the course of several years."

Rep. John Tierney (D-MA) had also lobbied hard to secure the unclassified report, which the subcommittee finally received last week. The report was compiled by Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Philip Coyle, who left the Pentagon in January.

The restructure decision "having been made, the material should no longer fall within the ambit of any Department policy to withhold predecisional work papers from public view," Shays' letter states.

Coyle testified before the subcommittee last September that the report detailed NMD testing limitations, and promised to provide the report for the record.

"After the lengthy delay in providing the report, the subcommittee appreciates your making the information available," Shays wrote to DOD, adding the committee disagreed that "providing the report was in any way 'discretionary' on the part of the [DOD] and the subcommittee will be unable to comply with your request to limit access to the material."

"You do not assert the report contains classified information nor do you claim it contains proprietary or procurement-sensitive information that might warrant the limited access you request," he continued. "We do not concede an entire, vaguely-defined class of internal documents can be withheld from Congress in perpetuity. Even so-called 'predecisional' materials must be subject to congressional review once the underlying decision has been rendered."

The report, prepared in advance of a planned NMD deployment readiness review, resulted in a lengthy exchange of letters. Earlier this month, Pentagon acquisition chief Pete Aldridge wrote the subcommittee to say, "I understand that the Department is making a discretionary release" of the report, and to provide an update of changes initiated since the report was complete.

"A revised missile defense program strategy is being considered that changes our focus from 'design- to-threat' to 'design-to-capability.' This capability-based approach avoids designs that may be effective only against specific threats," Aldridge wrote June 5. Many of these changes were codified last week in program budget decision No. 812, which changed oversight of many BMDO and service missile defense initiatives (DefenseAlert, June 25). Frame also noted that new BMDO efforts to "identify and develop solutions to likely threat countermeasures" are significant because "this area will be a continuing challenge to the NMD program."

In an interview today, Coyle said BMDO's recent moves to improve testing are encouraging. He specifically cited plans to test against a "tumbling" reentry vehicle, multiple reentry vehicles and additional decoys.

Although the report cited the lack of maturity inherent in NMD systems, which makes realistic testing difficult, Coyle said today that it was "not at all" too early for DOT&E to evaluate the program last summer -- because of the planned deployment decision, which was subsequently deferred to the Bush administration. In the report itself, still marked "for official use only," Coyle said the practice of using a single balloon to represent a decoy in flight tests is unacceptable. BMDO must "incorporate challenging unsophisticated countermeasures that have the potential to be used" against NMD interceptors, he wrote.

"Use of the large balloon should be discontinued, as it does not mimic in any way" the current NMD re-entry vehicle, Coyle wrote.

The report noted that the NMD trend has been for the schedule to slip 20 months every three years, which made the planned initial operational capability date of 2005 highly suspect.

BMDO spokesman Lt. Col. Richard Lehner told InsideDefense.com today that the goal remains to achieve NMD IOC five years after a deployment decision is made, so no target IOC date is currently in place.

-- Adam J. Hebert

Inside Missile Defense

June 27, 2001

Pg. 1

PM: THAAD Program \$13 Million Under Baseline And Ahead Of Schedule

The Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense program is \$13 million under its baseline budget and several months ahead of schedule in many areas, a THAAD official told Inside Missile Defense.

"A rough figure is we're \$13 million under where we . . . would have expended according to our baseline plan at this point in the program," said Col. Patrick O'Reilly, THAAD project manager, in a June 26 interview. O'Reilly said the \$13 million figure applies to the original \$4 billion THAAD contract.

"What it shows is we did a very good job, the contractor and the government, of estimating the original program costs in the contract," he added. "And half of coming in on cost and schedule is how good . . . how realistic, was the original contract," he added.

O'Reilly estimated that approximately 10 percent of the contract value has been executed so far.

In addition to being under budget on the program, O'Reilly also said the program is well ahead of schedule in many areas.

Under the original contract, the first flight tests were scheduled for fiscal year 2004. "We may beat that by a few months according to our current estimations of progress we're making on the program," O'Reilly said.

"The bottom line is the program's doing very well. As the contract was laid out last year, we are executing actually slightly under cost and slightly ahead of schedule in the overall program. Technically, we've been addressing all the risks that were previously identified and we are retiring those risks on schedule."

THAAD has come under fire in the past, and just last year a GAO report called the system a prime example of a host of testing problems that typically plague the development of Defense Department weapon systems (IMD, Aug. 7, 2000, p.1). THAAD had earlier suffered through a string of test failures that nearly led to its termination before the ship was righted in 1999.

A recent Pentagon budget document shows that the Bush administration plans to move away from the existing "design-to-threat" approach for missile defense and toward a "design-to-capability" approach. Under the plan, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization would restructure its program architecture by merging programs such as THAAD into a single midcourse defense project. O'Reilly said he has not officially received word of any changes. "Officially, which is what I have to deal with here on this program and the contract, I have not been given any direction to change the program from the way it was approved last year," he said. "People in Washington ask us [for] input and things -- but officially I have not gotten any change yet." All major program milestones and dates remain the same, said O'Reilly, with the exception of those areas that are actually ahead of schedule.

O'Reilly cites work on the program's radar as one area that is progressing rapidly.

"We had half-a-billion lines of software code in our old radar that has to be re-hosted on a new generation of computers . . . for the new radar," he said. "And all of that has been successful and we've been working simulations with the new radar system software."

"We're building the initial pilot array," O'Reilly said. "It's a miniature radar, in effect, it's a basic building block of the new radar that THAAD's going to have in EMD. And this month we are completing the fabrication of that pilot array and putting it into tests, and we're completing the design of the radar in August." O'Reilly said completion of the radar in August would be three months ahead of schedule.

O'Reilly said testing of various missile components and how they function in flight has been progressing well this year. "We've been conducting booster tests this year, we've been conducting Divert and Attitude Control motor [(DAC)] tests. Different parts of the missile and how they perform in flight, such as the separation of the shroud," he said. "All of that has been going very well and our tests are occurring on schedule."

O'Reilly said parts of the program have recently moved into a new test facility. Boeing reduced its ability to test in-house liquid propulsion systems, such as those used in the DAC, so THAAD needed a new facility for engineering and manufacturing development. The Redstone Arsenal test facility in Huntsville, AL was selected for that purpose, O'Reilly said.

"We had risk reductions tests this year to test the new facility," he said. An initial set of firings was completed in May and eight additional firings were done June 24 to verify that the facility is up and operating properly. "We're ready to start this fall with some of the EMD designs, into the spring, as we build up the DAC system it will be tested here in Huntsville," O'Reilly said.

Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, recently testified before House and Senate committees that no missile defense tests planned for 2002-2003 would violate the 1972 ABM Treaty.

O'Reilly confirmed that that statement was accurate as applied to the THAAD program as well.

"There really isn't a treaty issue on this program," O'Reilly said. "I was on the program back in the early 90's and I can attest firsthand that the THAAD program was designed to go after the theater missile class of threats. And that was prior to any discussion about the ABM Treaty. And that's what drives our missile systems performance -- the theater-class threats. We have been through many reviews over the past 10 years, and it shows our performance does not bring us up to the class of performance that would have treaty concerns."

-- **Jeff Bennett**

Taipei Times
June 27, 2001

Military Denies Cruise Missile Project

UNDER WRAPS: The defense ministry insisted its Hsiung Feng-III project is an anti-ship missile and not a new cruise missile as local media reports have indicated

By Brian Hsu, Staff Reporter

The military's Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology yesterday denied a local media report that it is developing a cruise missile code-named Hsiung Feng-III.

Rear Admiral David Soong, vice president of the institute, said the Hsiung Feng-III is not a cruise missile, but rather an anti-ship missile.

"The missile is an enhanced version of the Hsiung Feng-II anti-ship missile, which is already in service with the navy. That's why it is called the Hsiung Feng-III," Soong said.

"We are also developing a next-generation anti-ship missile called Hsiung Feng-III. Hsiung Feng-III is a super-sonic anti-ship missile, while the Hsiung Feng-III is sub-sonic," he said.

Soong made the remarks yesterday at a regular Ministry of National Defense press conference in response to inquiries from the press over reports that the institute is developing the Hsiung Feng-III as a cruise missile.

A local Chinese-language newspaper reported yesterday that the Hsiung Feng-III is Taiwan's version of the US Tomahawk, and that its maximum range is 1,000km.

It is the second time in two weeks that the military has denied local media reports regarding highly sensitive missile development projects.

The first time also involved a report in a local Chinese-language newspaper that said the military is currently developing a medium-range ballistic missile under a project code-named "Dichin."

The report was denied by the ministry.

Quoting anonymous defense sources, yesterday's report said the Hsiung Feng-III development project has been intentionally kept a secret from the public.

The Hsiung Feng-III is a copycat of the US-made Tomahawk, the newspaper said, since its design looks quite similar to that of the Tomahawk.

A defense source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told the Taipei Times that the Hsiung Feng-III is apparently being developed with technical assistance from the US.

"One of the [pieces of] evidence is that a prototype of the Hsiung Feng-III was test-fired in the US several years ago.

"If the US is not involved in the Hsiung Feng-III project, how was Taiwan able to test-fire the missile in the US?" the source said.

The paper said the Hsiung Feng-III has a maximum range of 1,000km, capable of hitting strategic military assets in China, ranging from Guangzhou in the south to Shenyang in the northeast.

In response, Soong said: "The report is based on a hypothetical assumption by its writer and his associates. We have no comment on it."

The Hsiung Feng-III, according to Soong, is purely an anti-ship missile development project. Soong denied that the Hsiung Feng-III has the ability to attack land targets, saying the missile is to be used against targets on the sea.

Soong failed, however, to make a clear distinction between the Hsiung Feng-III and Hsiung Feng-III, which he said are both anti-ship missiles.

Soong only said: "The Hsiung Feng-III is an enhanced version of the Hsiung Feng-II, while the Hsiung Feng-III is a next-generation weapon."

Wednesday June 27 6:12 AM ET

Russia Tests Old Missile in Apparent Hint to U.S.

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia test-fired a 26-year-old ballistic missile on Wednesday, hinting the weapon could gain new life as a "hydra-headed" countermeasure if the United States pressed on with President Bush ([news](#) - [web sites](#))'s defense plans.

The Russian military said it had test-fired a huge Stiletto missile from Russia's space base at Baikonur in Kazakhstan.

Missile tests are not uncommon in Russia, but Wednesday's came a week after President Vladimir Putin ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) threatened to stack multiple nuclear warheads on Russian missiles as a countermeasure to a proposed U.S. anti-rocket shield.

The Stiletto, referred to by NATO ([news](#) - [web sites](#)) as the SS-19, was built between the mid-1970s and 80s, and can carry a payload of more than four tons.

A Russian Strategic Rocket Forces official told Reuters the Stiletto could be re-equipped to carry up to six warheads. Only the even older SS-18 Satan missile, which could carry 10-12 warheads, is bigger. The Satans are now set to be scrapped altogether under the START-2 arms control treaty signed by Bush's father in 1993. Russia's most modern strategic missile, the Topol-M, is more mobile than the older generations of rockets, but only carries one ton of payload. It could also be refitted to take more than one warhead.

Itar-Tass news agency said a military source had told it Russia's older, larger missiles would be "the only way of resolving strategic tasks in contemporary conditions."

"Compared to (the Topol-M, the Stiletto) has a considerably higher chance of overcoming the ABM system of the likely enemy," due to its larger payload, it quoted the source as saying.

Under START-2, Moscow and Washington agreed to scrap "hydra-headed" multiple-warhead rockets.

But Putin said last week that START-2 would be automatically void if Washington pulls out of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile pact to build a new defense shield.

He said no missile defense system would be able to counter multiple warhead rockets for decades.

Bush has said the ABM treaty is a Cold War-era relic and should be scrapped to allow the United States to develop a high-tech shield against missiles that may be fired by states such as Iraq or North Korea ([news](#) - [web sites](#)).

http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010627/pl/arms_russia_dc_3.html

New York Times
June 28, 2001
Pg. 1

Pentagon To Ask For Retirement Of MX Missiles

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, June 27 — The Pentagon will ask Congress for permission to begin scrapping all 50 of its nuclear-tipped MX missiles as a possible first step toward a unilateral reduction in the nation's nuclear arsenal, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced today.

The missiles with their multiple warheads and ability to decimate Russian missile silos, were a signature program of President Ronald Reagan, whose administration fought acrimonious battles with Congressional Democrats over the size of the program and the basing of the missile, which it called the Peacekeeper, in the 1980's.

But President Bush is, in essence, proposing to dismantle one of Mr. Reagan's legacies in order to advance another of Mr. Reagan's goals: building a system to defend the nation from long-range ballistic missiles. Mr. Bush has said he would be willing to cut "to the lowest possible number" the nation's nuclear arsenal as part of a new strategic "framework" with Russia that included a missile shield.

The request regarding the MX will be part of the detailed 2002 budget proposal that Mr. Rumsfeld will present to Congress on Thursday. That plan will ask for an \$18.4 billion increase over the \$310 billion defense budget that the president proposed in February, with most of the additional money going toward health care, higher pay, spare parts and missile defense programs.

In announcing the MX missile proposal today, the Pentagon offered almost no details about how quickly the weapons system would be dismantled, what would happen to the warheads and whether the administration was considering reductions in other nuclear weapons.

Indeed, Mr. Rumsfeld portrayed the proposal purely as a budget issue, saying he had been forced to decide whether to set aside money to maintain the missiles or to retire them before he had time to consider the appropriate size of the nuclear force. Air Force officials say it takes more than \$70 million a year to maintain the missiles. The new budget asks for an initial sum of \$17 million to begin retiring the weapons system.

Mr. Rumsfeld is overseeing a review of nuclear policy expected to include recommendations on the size of the nuclear force, consisting of missiles, submarines and bombers.

In a news conference today, Mr. Rumsfeld said he was recently told, "You've got the Peacekeeper, there's no money in the budget for the next five years to keep it, there's no money to retire it, and there's a law that says you can't retire it."

But defense officials acknowledged that in making his budget decision to retire the MX, Mr. Rumsfeld had dictated nuclear policy.

"The president has talked about an overall reduction in the nuclear forces, so this is heading in that direction," a senior Air Force officer said.

To retire the MX, the administration must ask Congress to rescind a law enacted during the Clinton administration that prohibits the Pentagon from reducing the nuclear arsenal below the levels set by Start I, with Russia.

Congressional Republicans who supported that law said they wanted to review the administration's MX proposal before commenting.

Advocates of arms control, who have been dogged critics of Mr. Bush's missile defense plan, welcomed today's announcement, saying it was a start toward the fulfillment of Mr. Bush's campaign pledge to reduce the nuclear arsenal.

"I was happy to hear it," said John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World, a nonprofit group that promotes lower military spending. "Until I saw it, I couldn't be sure it would happen."

But Mr. Isaacs and other arms control experts said the significance of the proposal would rest in its details, which have yet to be worked out. For instance, it is not clear whether the warheads from the MX missiles — each missile has as many as 10 warheads — will also be retired or remounted on other missiles.

Even before the new proposal, the Pentagon had been considering dismantling its MX missiles — which are based in hardened underground silos at F. E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming.

One plan called for remounting the missiles' W-87 warheads on Minuteman missiles scattered around the country and then retiring the older Minuteman warheads. The W-87 warheads are considered more powerful and reliable than most other nuclear weapons.

If all of the 500 MX missile warheads were retired, the American nuclear strategic arsenal would still include 6,700 warheads.

Bruce Blair, a former Minuteman launch control officer who is president of the Center for Defense Information, a Pentagon watchdog group, said Mr. Bush could have had a much greater impact on the debate over missile defense if he had proposed immediately deactivating all 50 MX missiles rather than retiring them over many years.

"It would be a spectacular announcement to say they are taking them all off alert at once," Mr. Blair said.

The MX program was initially approved by the Carter administration as a counter to a new generation of heavy Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. But Mr. Reagan championed the weapon, depicting it as a core part of his military buildup, but Congress whittled his request to build 200 missiles to 100, and eventually to 50.

Mr. Rumsfeld's budget proposal will also request a \$3 billion increase in spending on missile defense, to \$8.3 billion. The request will include restructuring missile defense programs to speed development of technologies that the Bush administration considers promising, including airborne and space-based lasers.

The plan will also call for developing new missile defense test sites in Alaska. Although Pentagon officials said those sites would be used to conduct more realistic flight tests on antimissile technology, they also said the Pentagon would consider declaring them fully operational if a missile attack against the nation seemed imminent.

Mr. Rumsfeld's plan also calls for cutting the nation's fleet of B-1 bombers to about 60, from 93, and for converting two Ohio-class submarines to carry conventional weapons instead of nuclear missiles.

After being adjusted for inflation, Mr. Rumsfeld's plan would represent a 7 percent, or \$33 billion, increase over President Bill Clinton's final defense budget of \$296 billion, making it the largest Pentagon increase since the Reagan years.

Despite that, some senior defense officials and their supporters in Congress have said the increase is too small. At the same time, fiscal conservatives in Congress have expressed strong skepticism about the size of the Pentagon request.

Washington Times

June 28, 2001

Pg. 1

China, N. Korea Hit With Sanctions

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The State Department has imposed sanctions on companies in China and North Korea for selling chemical-weapons materials and missile engines to Iran.

State Department officials yesterday told The Washington Times that sales to Iran by China's Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import and Export Corp. and by North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corp. triggered a provision of a 2000 law on weapons shipments to Iran.

Both companies had previously been sanctioned by the United States for weapons sales.

A State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the action shows the administration will follow U.S. laws aimed at curbing the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological arms, and missile-delivery systems.

"It is an indication the administration is prepared to implement our sanctions law," the official said.

The sanctions bar any U.S. government agency from doing business with the companies or providing assistance to them.

"We did what was required under the law," the State Department spokesman said. "The sanctions will last for two years."

Officials said the sanctions are largely symbolic since the U.S. government does not do business with the companies in question.

The department had made no public announcement of the sanctions, which appeared Tuesday in the Federal Register, the official outlet for U.S. government announcement of the imposition of sanctions.

It is the first time the Bush administration has imposed economic sanctions for weapons-related transfers. Some administration officials, including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, have questioned the use of sanctions as a foreign-policy tool.

The State Department official said the Chinese company was sanctioned in 1997 for helping build a facility for manufacturing dual-use equipment that can make chemical arms. "Recently, we observed some more recent behavior [by the company] that enabled the Iranians to get this plant up and running," the official said.

The North Korean company was sanctioned for its role in providing Iran with missile engines. The sales triggered a U.S. law that calls for sanctions on sales that violate the provisions of the multination Missile Technology Control Regime.

U.S. intelligence officials disclosed to The Times last year that North Korea sold 12 missile engines to Iran in November 1999. The engines were believed to be for Iran's new Shahab medium-range missiles.

The Chinese company, located in Nanjing, produces a variety of chemicals and related equipment, including pipes and pumps, that have applications for building chemical weapons, U.S. officials said. In 1997, it criticized the earlier U.S. sanctions as based on "groundless" charges.

The Changgwang Sinyong company was slapped with U.S. economic sanctions in April 2000 for selling missile technology to Syria. It was also sanctioned in January for other missile sales.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act calls for sanctions on companies or governments that sell goods that can be used for Iran's weapons of mass destruction or missile programs.

The law, sponsored by Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, New York Republican, requires the president to report to Congress regularly on weapons and related sales to Iran that would be banned under U.S. law.

It was targeted at Russian firms that helped Iran's missile programs. But the legislation also covers sales of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons-related materials that would boost Iran's capability to build such arms.

China and North Korea are considered by the U.S. intelligence agencies that track weapons sales to be among the most aggressive suppliers of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile goods and technology to developing nations.

China has been sanctioned by the U.S. government in the past for its arms sales. A CIA intelligence report in 1996 stated that a Chinese firm shipped 400 metric tons of chemicals used in producing nerve gas to an Iranian chemical-arms center.

China also helped Iran during the late 1990s to build a factory that produces special glass-lined equipment -- a key element in manufacturing chemical weapons.

China is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which obligates Beijing not to assist any country in developing chemical arms. But a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report in September stated that China "consistently fails to adhere to its nonproliferation commitments."

A CIA report to Congress made public in February stated that Iran in the first half of 2000 "continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and China."

The report said Iran has stockpiled "several thousand tons" of chemical arms, including blood, blister and choking agents.

U.S. officials believe Iran plans to use chemical weapons in warheads for missiles it is developing, including a new medium-range Shahab missile that has been tested several times in the past two years.

Wall Street Journal
June 28, 2001

Pentagon Is Preparing Contract For Missile-Defense System Site

By Greg Jaffe and Carla Anne Robbins, Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON -- The Pentagon has prepared a contract that would allow it to begin readying a site for a national missile defense system at Fort Greeley, Alaska, as early as this August, according to U.S. defense officials.

It isn't clear whether President Bush will give the go-ahead. But the Pentagon's rush to identify a contractor and prepare the documents reflects Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's eagerness to move ahead with missile defense.

It is likely to anger both Russia and U.S. allies who are counting on months more of consultations with Mr. Bush before any decision is made on deploying a system.

Separately, Mr. Rumsfeld announced Wednesday that he will ask Congress for permission to retire 50 MX missiles - with a total of 500 nuclear warheads -- by next year, five years before the deadline agreed to with Russia as part of the Start II treaty.

In an effort to allay Russian and allied fears about his missile-defense plans, Mr. Bush has pledged to make deep cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The move on the MX missiles was applauded by arms-control advocates as a good first step. "Its real significance is as a harbinger of deeper cuts to come," said Joseph Cirincione, of the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Wednesday's announcement by Mr. Rumsfeld surprised some White House officials, who were hoping to garner maximum diplomatic and political advantage by unveiling a broader package of nuclear reductions, including the MX cuts, sometime later this year. Officials said any decision on deeper cuts is still weeks away.

The site preparation contract, prepared by the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, would allow workers to begin grading the ground and installing concrete platforms for five to 10 missile interceptors in Alaska. Pentagon officials acknowledged the move would be mainly symbolic. The Pentagon is required under law to notify Congress 30 days prior to awarding the contract, which means the earliest that work could begin is August. Given Alaska's short construction season, the most the project would gain is about eight weeks of building time this year. Pentagon officials say the basic site preparation won't violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. That point would come, they say, only after construction begins on missile silos, probably sometime in 2003 if Mr. Bush approves the plan.

There are serious questions about how effective the ground-based system would be, even against so-called rogue states such as North Korea or Iraq. In early tests of the system, the interceptors failed to hit their targets on two out of three tries. A fourth test is scheduled for this summer.

And without new radar and satellites, which are still years away from being ready, the interceptors would be incapable of distinguishing incoming warheads from even low-tech decoys.

Pentagon officials declined to name the contractor they have identified for the project. But officials said that a Native American-owned firm would do the initial site preparation.

DefenseNews.com

June 27, 2001

U.S. Air Force Missile Defense Programs Moving To BMDO

By Gail Kaufman, DefenseNews.com Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon announced that key U.S. Air Force missile defense programs will be moved to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization this fall. The programs include Airborne Laser, Space Based Laser and Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) Low.

Defense Department comptroller Dov Zakheim told reporters June 27 that because the three programs are in their early stages BMDO should oversee them.

Of the Pentagon's total \$328.9 billion budget request, \$80.5 billion of it will go toward Air Force initiatives.

The Air Force also plans to cut its fleet of 91 B-1B Lancer bombers to 60 to save on maintenance costs and help fund upgrades to the remaining planes, according to the service's June 27 budget briefing here.

In addition, the Air Force intends to spend \$2.8 billion to modernize its cargo and fighter aircraft as well as the B-2 bomber.

The Air Force in its 2002 budget request plans to spend \$23.9 billion on modernization, a 2 percent increase from 2001, specifically in science and technology accounts.

Included in the aerospace top investment programs, the Air Force plans to buy 13 F-22 fighter aircraft with \$3.92 billion in funding for low-rate initial production. The service also plans to spend \$3.78 to support the acquisition of 137 C-17s, according to the Air Force budget briefing.

Cambone Reports Options For ABM Treaty Under Review

By Kerry Gildea

The administration is looking at a wide range of ideas for a new framework to replace the ABM Treaty, Stephen Cambone, deputy under secretary of defense for policy nominee, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Wednesday.

President Bush has made clear that the ABM Treaty should be replaced with a new framework that facilitates development of a new cooperative relationship with Russia, Cambone said in written responses to SASC questions provided at his nomination hearing.

"The president is looking at a wide range of ideas for the framework, and whether amendments will be part of it remains under consideration," Cambone said. "In any case, it is clearly in our interest to reach agreement with Russia, if possible, and President Bush has made it clear that he seeks to move beyond treaty constraints cooperatively with the Russians."

Meanwhile, Cambone said the United States should proceed with missile defenses "in accordance with its national interests, taking into account the views of our allies."

Cambone added he thinks there are reasonable grounds for hoping that the United States and its allies will work closely and cooperatively in this area.

"We intend to move forward on defense against ballistic missiles of all ranges--defenses which would protect our friends and allies as well as the United States against the new threats which we all face. Our proposed system will not threaten the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent, even at significantly reduced levels of forces."

Cambone stressed the United States' missile defense program also is not a threat to China.

"It is intended to defend against threats or attacks from states currently attempting to acquire longer-range missiles," he said. "Since the late 1980s, China has been engaged in the modernization of its nuclear forces. This modernization is likely to continue regardless of what the U.S. does."

Rumsfeld: Peacekeeper 'Not Needed;' Retirement Can Save \$873 Million

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld informed the House Armed Services Committee yesterday that "the Air Force reviewed the situation and concluded that our some-50 Peacekeeper missiles [are] not needed," creating an opportunity for the Pentagon to save more than \$800 million by retiring them, officials say.

Although the Pentagon will spend more than half a billion dollars through 2020 to retire its 50 Peacekeeper missiles, budget officials say the move will actually save DOD \$873 million, compared to keeping the missiles active.

"We have some 7,500 offensive nuclear weapons," Rumsfeld told the committee June 28. "We don't need that many. The Peacekeeper will not make even the beginning of a dent in that total figure."

At a briefing on the Air Force fiscal year 2002 budget proposal, service budget officials said June 27 that the plan to retire the remaining "MX" missiles is estimated to cost \$514 million over 19 years -- beginning with \$17 million in FY-02.

In addition to the expense of removing the missiles and warheads from the sites, the long-term Peacekeeper costs include continued monitoring of the silos. A budget official told Inside the Air Force that long-term costs will include expenses associated with maintaining the silos to a degree because current plans do not call for the silos to be blown up or filled in. Historically, the silos were typically -- but not always -- destroyed when their missiles were decommissioned.

Nonetheless, Air Force projections hold that keeping the Peacekeepers in place would cost the service about \$73 million a year in operations, maintenance and support costs -- a total of nearly \$1.4 billion by 2020.

Accordingly, the service projects savings of \$873 million, roughly \$46 million per year. The budget official estimated the retirement process will take three to four years.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters during a June 27 briefing that the Bush administration inherited a defense budget with no money for the Peacekeepers.

The budget "did not have funding to keep it," Rumsfeld said, and "it did not have funding to retire it. How's that? You arrive at the Pentagon, they say, 'Here's the drill. You've got the Peacekeeper, there's no money in the budget for the next five years to keep it, there's no money to retire it, and there's a law that says you can't retire it.' How's that? Catch-22."

Department Comptroller Dov Zakheim added at the briefing that the Pentagon viewed Peacekeeper retirement as the economical option, noting DOD would seek relief from a law that prevents nuclear systems from being reduced below START levels without congressional approval.

"We were left with this rather peculiar [financial] legacy," Zakheim said.

Before the Peacekeepers can be dismantled, however, "There's a congressional restriction, and that restriction is you cannot take anything out of our current strategic nuclear forces below what are the START I levels . . . until such time as the second START Treaty is agreed to. And it hasn't been agreed to. So there's kind of a double-whammy here," the comptroller said.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty regulations require that silos be counted as strategic delivery systems. This has frequently required the destruction of silos to meet force-sizing limitations, said Philipp Bleek, an analyst with the Washington, DC, Arms Control Association. But the silos have not always been destroyed when their missiles were pulled, he added, and the United States would not be obligated to destroy them if the reductions took place outside the START framework.

In his first major speech on national security earlier this year, President Bush expressed willingness to reduce U.S. nuclear forces independent of formal, negotiated arms control agreements such as START.

"I'm committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies," Bush said May 1. "My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world."

"We can and will change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over," Bush added.

-- Adam J. Hebert

InsideDefense.com

June 28, 2001

Lawmakers Call On Bush To Take Nuclear Weapons Off High Alert

June 28, 2001 -- The Bush administration should work with Russia to take as many strategic nuclear weapons off "launch-on-warning" status as feasible, House and Senate lawmakers declared yesterday.

The de-alerting of nuclear weapons is one of three actions recommended in legislation introduced Wednesday by Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-LA) and Reps. John Spratt (D-SC) and Ellen Tauscher (D-CA). The other two actions included in the "Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001" would repeal the existing law that prevents the reduction of strategic forces below the 6,000-warhead START I level, and would increase funding for nonproliferation programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

"We don't believe that the [CTR] funding in the president's budget is sufficient," a congressional aide told InsideDefense.com. The Bush administration has requested \$773.7 million for Energy Department nonproliferation programs for FY-02. The legislation would authorize \$1.2 billion for DOE nonproliferation programs. It would also authorize \$600 million for DOD nonproliferation programs and \$200 million for State Department nonproliferation programs.

"These increases are substantial, but still fall short of what was recommended by the recent Baker-Cutler Task Force," Spratt said in a statement. The bipartisan task force -- headed by former Senate Majority Leader Howard

Baker and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler -- assessed U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs and urged that they be accelerated to address the United States' "most urgent unmet national security threat." The act would also establish an incentive program for Russia to spend more of its own money on nonproliferation in exchange for debt relief, the congressional aide said.

While the legislation would repeal the existing law that prevents the reduction of strategic forces below the 6,000-warhead START I level until START II is approved, it leaves the ultimate size of the reductions up to the administration. Spratt, Tauscher and Landrieu "did not want to put numbers here because those have to be decided by the White House and the Pentagon and our military leaders, but the fact that President Bush as a candidate spoke about these issues makes it clear that these are areas that should get a lot of bipartisan support," according to former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth, a senior adviser to the non-profit Justice Project's nuclear threat reduction campaign, which is also working to pass the bill. Inderfurth spoke with InsideDefense.com today.

"The fact is that it was the first President Bush who initiated a number of de-alerting measures in 1991, including taking a number of missiles off high alert as well as standing down our bomber force," Inderfurth said. "Then [Russian] President [Mikhail] Gorbachev took similar action, so the idea of taking missiles off a high state of alert has been done, and clearly what we're doing in this bill is encouraging the president to take these steps again, but leaving it up to him how many and how to do it."

In his first major speech on national security earlier this year, President Bush expressed willingness to reduce U.S. nuclear forces independent of formal, negotiated arms control agreements such as START.

"I'm committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs, including our obligations to our allies," Bush said May 1. "My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve our interests and the interests for peace in the world."

"We can and will change the size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over," Bush added.

In a related move, the Pentagon -- in a bid to save more than \$800 million -- this week announced plans to retire the Air Force's 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles.

-- John Liang

Washington Times

June 29, 2001

Pg. 9

Inside The Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

China slates ALCM test

China is moving ahead with testing of its new air-launched cruise missile -- Beijing's answer to the sea-launched Tomahawk land attack cruise missile.

U.S. intelligence officials said a second test of the new ALCM is set to take place soon. "They are moving ahead with the cruise-missile program," said one defense official. "It is a significant step forward for them."

The new cruise missile will be test-fired from a B-6 bomber over northern China. The first Chinese ALCM was tested in May and was assessed to be capable of carrying a 1,100-pound warhead. Its exact range could not be learned, but defense officials said it would be able to travel much farther distances than current China cruise missiles, which primarily are anti-ship weapons.

For the Record

Friday, June 29, 2001; Page A36

From remarks by Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) at a Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee hearing yesterday:

The latest State Department report, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," states . . . "Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000. Its Revolutionary Guard, ministry of intelligence and security, continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts." . . .

Iran is also stepping up its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The latest unclassified CIA report to Congress on worldwide acquisition of weapons of mass destruction notes, "Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and advanced chemical-weapons technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of weapons -- chemical, biological and nuclear -- and their delivery systems."

As for Libya, it has fulfilled only one aspect of the U.N. Security Council resolutions relating to the Pan Am 103 bombing, handing over suspects for trial. It has not fulfilled the requirement to pay compensation for the families of the victims, to accept responsibility for the actions of its intelligence officers and to fully renounce international terrorism.

. . . Because Iran and Libya have clearly not fulfilled the requirements of the [Iran-Libya Sanctions Act], I think to terminate these sanctions would send the wrong message.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61435-2001Jun28.html>

Pentagon Puts Money Where the People Are

Arms Spending Slips in Rumsfeld Budget

By Thomas E. Ricks

Washington Post Staff Writer

Thursday, June 28, 2001; Page A31

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld yesterday unveiled a fiscal 2002 defense budget that broadly increases spending on military pay, health care, recruiting, housing and other personnel-related accounts but drops the overall level of spending on weapons.

Rumsfeld described the proposed \$328.9 billion Pentagon budget for the federal fiscal year beginning Oct. 1 as an interim step to reverse what he described as years of decline under President Bill Clinton and to create the conditions for reforming the military, a major initiative of the Bush administration. But Rumsfeld conceded that the administration's first defense budget takes only small steps toward changing the military to meet the new threats of the 21st century.

"The coasting went on for too long" under Clinton, Rumsfeld said at a Pentagon news conference. "It took years to get into this circumstance and it's going to take some years to get out of it."

The budget documents released by the Pentagon make clear that the top priority isn't hardware but people. One of the biggest single increases is for military health care, a total of \$17.9 billion, with \$3.9 billion of that going to new benefits for military retirees over age 65. The budget also provides an across-the-board pay raise of 5 percent, with larger increases targeted for senior sergeants and mid-career officers.

Likewise, the \$80.2 billion budget for the Army cuts flying time for helicopters and driving time for tanks while paying the troops more and seeking to give them better places in which to eat, work and live. Pentagon Comptroller Dov S. Zakheim called the reduction in tank driving time "a minor risk" and explained that "they have to make life a little more livable for their people."

By contrast, the overall budget for the acquisition of weapons is scheduled to slip by about \$500 million, to \$61.6 billion. Nor does the budget offer any changes in "force structure," the number, shape and capabilities of the Army's divisions, the Navy's carrier battle groups and the Air Force's fighter wings.

There were a few small nods to Rumsfeld's aim of "transforming" the military to deal with new threats, such as a doubling in the budget for the Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft to \$307 million, and \$39 million in new spending on the detection of chemical and biological weapons. But these amounted to a fraction of the tens of billions of new spending on military health care, pay, housing and other personnel issues.

Rumsfeld said that whatever changes are made in force structure and in individual weapons, such as the B-2 bomber, the F-22 fighter and the DD-21 destroyer, will be decided in the coming months as his review of military strategy is concluded and the Pentagon's next budget, for fiscal 2003, is drawn up.

"I think this is going to be what's going to happen," Rumsfeld said. "I will be . . . reviewing the weapons systems and putting them in the context of the strategy and putting them in the context of how we see the total funds available over the period ahead and making those decisions."

He also indicated he expected those decisions to leak as they are made over the summer and fall. "There's not a secret in this building, that I know of," he said. "Almost everything is in the press before I know it."

In another move, the Pentagon said it was going to scrap the 50 Peacekeeper nuclear-tipped missiles.

Rumsfeld is scheduled to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee today on his proposed budget, and is likely to face criticism. Some Democrats may argue that the 10 percent increase over the \$296.3 billion spent in fiscal 2001 is too much, especially without a reform plan in place, while Republicans may fret that it is too little and that reform is moving too slowly.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55124-2001Jun27.html>

Friday, June 29, 2001, updated at 11:43(GMT+8) China

China Demands US to Remove Sanctions on Chinese Companies: FM

China on Thursday voiced its firm protest against the US' sanctions on Chinese companies for allegedly "helping [Iran](#) in violation of international agreements," and demanded that such unreasonable sanctions be removed.

China fully implements the obligations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and opposes development of chemical weapons by any country, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue told Thursday's press conference.

"We will by no means help any country develop such weapons," she said. "These companies are engaged in normal international chemical trade, which is in line with the spirit and goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention."

In China, the export of sensitive chemicals, equipment and technologies is managed in strict accordance with the checklist of the Chemical Weapons Convention and other regulations, said the spokeswoman, adding that the country never exports chemicals, equipment and technologies which are used for producing chemical weapons.

"We have promulgated strict laws and regulations governing such exports," she said.

On the other hand, the convention says explicitly that its contracting parties have the obligation to ensure normal trading and cooperation in the international chemical sector, she said.

Zhang pointed out that as contracting parties, both China and the [United States](#) are liable for fully implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention.

"China holds that internal laws and stipulations must never override international laws," she said, "and it is irrational for the United States to impose sanctions against Chinese companies using the excuse of so-called 'internal laws'."

China is an original member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bars the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and calls for their destruction, she said.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200106/29/eng20010629_73825.html